Raymond J. de Souza: Ukrainian protests reflect a healthy democracy

KRAKÓW, Poland — It’s been three years since I last visited Kraków, an historic European capital and a good place to think about developments in Ukraine.

During the Habsburg period of the 19th century, Kraków and Lviv, now western Ukraine’s principal city, were both governed from Vienna. When Poland regained its independence at the conclusion of World War I with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Kraków and Lviv remained together in the new Polish republic. The ties are deep in history, with moments of both harmony and hostility.

Cracovians, for reasons of both geography and the not-too-distant past, think more about Ukraine than in other places. Three developments in the past three years are noteworthy.

First, in the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Poles reacted heroically to the influx of refugees. There were no refugee camps. Not a single one. All Ukrainian refugees were received into Polish homes, often for an extended period. Given the hostilities in their shared history, that was not to be assumed. It represented a great reconciliation of siblings sometimes in rivalry.

Alas, there has been a recent rise in Polish resentment of the Ukraine war and Ukrainians, fomented by local instantiations of what is usually called right-wing populism. Hostility to Ukraine and a favourable disposition toward Russian President Vladimir Putin long had its champion in Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Under the second Trump administration, MAGA fondness for Putin and suspicion of Ukraine has given all of that a second wind in Europe despite Orbán’s defeat, and those ill winds are blowing in Poland.

Neither Poland’s government nor mainstream political culture has been captured by the Orbán/Trump turn toward Putin. (Recall that Donald Trump’s principal envoys have visited Putin eight times but refuse to set foot in Ukraine.) Nevertheless, a tilt toward Russia, or least against Ukraine, has gained more purchase here.

Second, Ukrainians demonstrated greater military strength in 2022 than many thought that they had. Certainly more than Moscow thought they had. One reason for that was the military training that took place after the initial Russian invasion in 2014, training to which Canada made a contribution. Nevertheless, Ukraine in 2022 relied heavily on military aid from Europe and North America, and Poland — which had the highest defence spending as a proportion of GDP in Europe — was at the forefront of that.

Over four years Ukraine still needs military supply, but has emerged as a military power of its own, producing millions of advanced drones capable of hitting Russian targets as far away as Siberia. The Gulf States, vulnerable to Iranian attack during the American-Israeli war, have invited Ukrainian officials to visit the region — including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy — to share expertise and technology.

Eventually, when the war is over and Trump leaves office, Ukraine will join NATO — as have Finland and Sweden since 2022 — and Ukraine will be a leading military power in the alliance.

Third, Ukraine has maintained a democratic culture. The Ukrainian constitution does not permit elections during wartime, but in recent weeks Ukrainians have taken to the streets to protest Zelenskyy’s decision to fire the defence minister and keep the top general. The street protests forced Zelenskyy to back down, fire the general and offer to keep the former defence minister in the government.

It was a repetition of what happened earlier when Zelenskyy proposed weakening the anti-corruption office in the national government. Protests forced him into a U-turn.

The reversals may have weakened Zelenskyy’s political authority, at least in the short term, but one reason Ukrainians are fighting and dying is to preserve a strong democracy, not a strong presidency or even a strong president.

It is quite possible, even in mature democracies like Canada, that executive strength can compromise the culture of democracy, for which elections are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Ukraine has managed, remarkably, to preserve and even enhance its democratic culture during the restrictions of wartime.

Still the war grinds on, the human costs continuing. It appears now that Ukraine may be prevailing or, at the very least, Russia is not prevailing. Absent the boost in oil revenues due to Trump’s war against Iran and continued support from China, Russia may otherwise be in danger of losing even what it seized in 2014. Ukraine is now capable of striking Crimea, threatening Russian supply lines.

Ukraine is fighting. Ukraine is still suffering. Russian missiles have so long hit civilian targets that it is no longer even remarked that such were once recognized as war crimes.

More sobering, while Ukraine fights on, it is not evident how the war might end. It is entirely possible that Ukraine may not lose, but still not win definitively. And however unpopular the war might be in Russia, Putin faces no constraints from a democratic culture.

National Post