Immigrants to Canada have adopted the country’s low-fertility rates, new research finds

Economic migrants, who make up the bulk of Canada’s immigrants, have adopted their new country’s behaviour in one significant area — they have very low fertility rates, new research suggests.

“Immigrants are feeling the low-fertility pressure of Canada here, like everyone else,” says demographer and sociologist Rachel Margolis, a professor at Western University, and one of the authors of a new paper on immigration and fertility.

Even groups with relatively high fertility — family stream and refugees — are also below the replacement level of 2.1 children, according to the research. Additionally, the top three source countries Canada draws immigrants from are low-fertility nations. The total fertility rate in India, the top source country, for instance, has dropped to 1.9 children per woman.

At a record low of 1.25 children per woman, Canada has entered an “ultra-low fertility” era. In 2024, it joined a list of several countries, including Finland, Italy and South Korea, with a fertility rate below 1.3.

Canada grows its population and bolsters the economy through immigration. But that short-term solution for population loss doesn’t address long-term population aging, according to the study.

While immigrants have higher fertility than native-born Canadians, the divide is shrinking and will likely continue to do so, the study suggests.

“Our findings highlight that immigrants have low and declining fertility, and so these assumptions, the way that our government is sustaining and growing the population, is a short-term fix,” says Margolis. “As these immigrants are aging, and if they’re having fewer than replacement kids, which they are, we’re still going to have a smaller younger generation. We’re still going to be dealing with population aging.”

Falling birth rates affect many areas of society, including the economy, housing and health care, but “the most important implications are existential,” says Howard Ramos, a Western University sociology professor and another of the report’s authors, along with Yue Teng and Yoko Yoshida. “There is no economy without people.”

There are also more individual implications of low fertility, says Margolis. “There’s a lot of research that finds that in Canada and across other similar countries, on average, people have fewer kids than they want. They have fewer kids than they think are ideal. They have fewer kids than they actually want in their lives, and this is a problem.”

Immigrants to Canada are a diverse group, which the authors say is often overlooked in immigrant fertility research. Historically, they’ve had higher fertility than native-born people, but this finding is based on research from the late 1990s. “Despite the rapid expansion of immigration to Canada, studies on the fertility patterns of immigrants have not kept pace,” they write.

Recently published in Population Research and Policy Review, their paper examines immigrant fertility in Canada over two decades. It found that age at migration, immigration stream and source country all play a role in fertility.

“The way that we’ve been dealing with low fertility in Canada for quite a long time, and really propping up the economy, is with immigration. It used to be that immigrants were coming from high-fertility places or similar fertility places. These people were acclimatizing to Canada, and they had similar numbers of kids — or more kids — but now, this paper shows that fertility is declining for immigrants and native-born,” says Margolis.

When it comes to long-term solutions, “It’s not that immigration is not the answer. The immigration policy that we have now is not the answer,” adds Margolis.

The paper challenges other commonly held myths about immigration, including that economic migrants and younger immigrants who move to Canada have high or stable fertility. “In fact, they have low fertility — or even lower fertility for the 1.5 generation. So, we basically offer some evidence that’s much needed to try and recalibrate the assumptions people have when they debate immigration policy,” says Ramos.

People being able to form the families they want is a significant part of what they consider makes a good life, says Margolis. Not everyone wants children, but many people do. Research has shown that various factors can delay or limit fertility, including difficulty finding a partner, financial considerations and health issues. She highlights that we don’t have this data for Canada, and what works elsewhere doesn’t necessarily translate.

Ramos adds that the country’s 14 health care systems — 13 provincial and territorial and one Indigenous-administered — also pose challenges in understanding the factors affecting fertility. “We don’t have coordinated data, and we don’t have easy access to coordinated data.”

He adds that Margolis’ broader project on fertility and immigration shows the need to invest in demographic research, which is lacking in Canada today.

Canada doesn’t have a population policy or well-set-out goals, adds Margolis. The government’s $40 billion plan to “defend, build and transform the North,” for example, raises demographic questions, such as “Will there be more of a population presence there?” and “Will migrants be encouraged to settle in different places?”

“There are so many basic questions about the changing demography of Canada that need to be answered, and these papers are trying to do part of that,” says Margolis, referring to the 2025 study published in Demographic Research she wrote with Yue Teng and Ramos on trends in Indigenous fertility and her 2026 paper on religious differences in fertility and immigration published in Canadian Jewish Studies.

Ramos highlights that it’s probably time for the country to consider a population strategy. “I think Canada’s policy has largely focused on economic issues and treated other issues as challenges to the economy, whereas really, underlying most of the economic issues are demographic issues.”